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African swine fever (ASF) is an infectious, viral disease of swine, notifiable to the World 
Organization of Animal Health (OIE). It elicits stronger sanitary, social and economic 
impacts than many other pig diseases because the occurrence of ASF is sufficient to 
activate regional, national and international trade restrictions. ASF affects domestic 
and wild pigs regardless of breed and age. Depending on viral strain and 
immunological status of the animal, infection can result to a broad range of clinical 
presentations varying from per-acute to chronic disease including apparently 
asymptomatic courses. Fortunately, it is not a zoonotic disease, which limits its impact 
on public health. 
The first ASF outbreak in Europe was reported in Portugal in 1957, with the virus 
spreading over most of Western Europe over the next 30 years. ASF has been endemic 
in Sardinia since 1978. In 2007, ASF entered Eastern Europe from East Africa. Since 
then, ASF has spread from the Caucasus region to the Russian Federation (2007), 
Ukraine (2012), Belarus (2013), Estonia (2014), Latvia (2014), Lithuania (2014), Poland 
(2014) and Moldova (2016).The latest countries affected in Europe are Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania ,all with cases in wild boar or domestic 
pigs in 2017 or 2018. 
 
Keywords: (Europe, African swine fever, prevention, control, Serres) 
  
 




I would also like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Savvas Genitsaris for his 




                                                                                                                          Maria Tsakalidou 
31/12/2020 
  -i- 
Preface 
Greece has reported the first outbreak of ASF in domestic pigs, in a small-holding of 32 
pigs, in a noncommercial farm in Nikokleia village of Serres Regional Unit, in the Region 
of Central Macedonia, on February 2020. The suspicion of the outbreak was posed on 
03.02.2020 and the presence of the virus was laboratory confirmed on 05.02.2020.The 
outbreak was reported to the ADNS system on 05.02.2020 and WAHIS platform of OIE 
on 06.02.2020. 
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Introduction 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The pig sector worldwide and in the E.U  
Pigs represent a significant source of relatively low cost and high quality-animal 
protein for a number of reasons including rapid growth rate, adequate conversion of 
feed into body weight, fast turnover and breeding characteristics (early sexual 
maturity and large litter size)(1). Therefore, and as the worldwide demands for meat 
consumption are constantly increasing, following a raising world population, a 
substantial increase in the production of pork can also be expected. Pork actually, 
ranks first as the most consumed meat of animal origin intended for human 
consumption, as it represents more than 37 % of global meat intake. Chicken (35.2 %) 
is in second place, while beef ranks third (21.6 %). Asia is the world’s leading producer, 
representing slightly less than 56% of global pork production, while China alone, meets 
about 50% of the global pork needs (1). (See Figure 1) 
 
Figure 1.Global pork production: Modified by: Source FAO 2017, ASF Manual for Veterinarians 
 
The European Union (EU) ranks second in the global pork supply (24, 3 %) but at the 
same time the EU is the world’s greatest trading power as regards to pork and pork 
products exports which represent about 13% of the intra-Community production. East 
Asia and more specifically China, import the largest quantities of the European pork 
(2).Amongst the European countries, Germany, Spain and France produce, 
cumulatively, more than half of the EU's pork, followed by Poland, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and finally the United Kingdom. (See Figure 2) 
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Figure 2: Pig meat: slaughtering in the EU Member States, 2016, Modified by Source: Eurostat (2016) 
 
There are different systems of production in the pork industry, but the two main ones 
are the traditional -small scale production and the industrialised -highly intensified, 
large-scale production system. 
The traditional -small scale production system is represented by small farms, ranches, 
backyards and it is mainly used in the developing countries. In these countries with 
little industrial and economic activity where people have low incomes, the pigs are 
used not only for their meat. These animals convert kitchen waste into quality protein 
and provide dung for the fertilisation of crofts and lakes, contributing to the financial 
support and stability of the small farmers (3). Indeed pork, in addition to its nutritional 
value, in many societies is part of the traditional way of living and offers an additional, 
valuable income which allows small farmers to cover medical and education expenses 
as well as the cost of small personal or family plans. The drawbacks of the small-scale 
production system are the low biosecurity standards, the old-fashioned technologies 
and husbandry settings, the lack of education and respect to the rules regarding the 
movements of the animals, the unwillingness to report any signs of disease and the 
insufficient or sometimes completely absent vaccination programmes (3). 
The large-scale production systems using the contracting or integration methods aim 
at satisfying the increased pork demand in the world. This intensified system by using 
the same genetic material (only few specific breeds) and husbandry (small number of 
larger farms) is achieving more “predictable” and higher pork production. The 
biosecurity and the modern adjustment of the production protocols are crucial issues 
in this system (3). 
The small-scale production method is still providing 43% of the pigs mainly in the 
developing countries but the compromised biosecurity, people’s mentality, lack of 
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knowledge and financial restraints are responsible for the introduction and spread of 
ASF and other pig diseases (3). 
 
1.2 African Swine Fever (ASF)-An overview 
Unfortunately, the supply of global market with pork is threatened by a number of 
infectious diseases of pigs, such as African Swine Fever (ASF), Classical Swine Fever 
(CSF), Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS), Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD) and more. Among these, ASF is particularly worrying as it has a dramatic impact 
on the pig sector, in both the industrial farming as well as the traditional, small-scale 
holdings located in rural areas or “disadvantaged” urban areas (4).Indeed, ASF can lead 
to massive livestock and financial losses. ASF is a greatly contagious, fatal, viral disease 
that strikes both the domestic pig and wild boar population without age, breed or sex 
predilections, ranging from per-acute to chronic form, while asymptomatic cases are 
not excluded (5). Clinical manifestation of ASF varies in intensity and the severity of the 
symptoms as well as the mortality, depends mostly on three factors: the virulence of 
the strain, the infectious dose, and the infection route. Indeed, in per-acute and acute 
clinical forms mortality rate can be up to 100%, while it appears significantly decreased 
in subclinical and chronic form, ranging from 0–60% (6).  
ASF is a disease for which declaration is mandatory and is listed as one of the six swine 
diseases classified as notifiable to the World Organization of Animal Health (OIE). 
Furthermore, is classified as a member of a special category of diseases, known as: 
Transboundary Animal Diseases (TADs). TADs are defined as those that are of 
substantial financial, trade and/or food safety concern for a significant number of 
countries and which can quickly and effortlessly cross the borders and spread over 
long distances to other nations and unfortunately reach epidemic dimensions. Most of 
the times, in order to ensure an effective, complete and lasting control of TADs, 
constant and efficient cross-border, transnational collaboration of different 
authorities, is needed (7). The dramatic consequences of ASF, compared to those of 
other pig diseases and at many different levels such as sanitary, social and financial are 
due to the fact that even a limited outbreak of ASF is enough to activate an emergency 
response which includes ,amongst other measures, regional, national and international 
trade strictures (8). The OIE World Animal Health Information System is a valuable 
platform which is up-dated constantly, on a daily basis actually, and provides detailed 
information on new ASF outbreaks, around the world, not only in domestic pigs but 
also in wild boar. In addition, follow-up reports and interactive maps of disease 
occurrence for particular time periods are also accessible. Apart from OIE, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations also releases updates on the 
ongoing ASF context (4). 
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Undoubtedly, the best means of combating animal diseases is to prevent them for 
occurring in the first place and vaccination is the key measure for the efficient 
prevention of almost all diseases. Unfortunately, up until today ,mostly because of the 
great antigenic heterogeneity of the ASF virus, there is neither effective vaccine, nor 
treatment to aid in the control of ASF, therefore, eradication is based mainly on 
prevention measures, early detection by rapid field identification, isolation of 
suspected cases and diagnosis through laboratory confirmation, followed by 
implementation of strict sanitary measures (animal slaughter of infected farms 
supplemented with movement restrictions and area quarantine). 
Thankfully, ASF is not a zoonotic disease, thus the impact of the disease on public 
health is quite limited. 
 
1.3 History – Outbreaks of ASF 
ASF was detected for the first time in Kenya in 1909, and Montgomery in 1921 was the 
first person which stated that even though this new disease had a lot of similarities 
with Classical Swine Fever (CSF), it was actually a different disease (5). At that time, 
ASF was reported as an acute hemorrhagic disease with high mortality, close to 100 %, 
only in domestic pigs. However, shortly after, it was recognized that the disease wasn’t 
new in that area. On the contrary, ASF had already been circulated in Kenya for a long 
time, amongst wild hosts, particularly warthogs, which did not show any clinical signs 
(9). Until the mid-20th century, ASF was successfully confined to Africa. Sadly, in 1957 
ASF entered Europe from West Africa and the first outbreak of ASF was reported in 
Lisbon, Portugal (9).The most probable cause for this first introduction was 
contaminated, uncooked waste food of African origin, which was fed to pigs close to 
Lisbon airport (7). Fortunately, this outbreak was rapidly controlled, but three years 
later, ASF re-entered Portugal and spread rapidly to the Iberian Peninsula and 
gradually to several other European countries  including : France (1964), Italy (1967, 
1969, 1983), Malta (1978), Belgium (1985) and the Netherlands (1986). The 
transcontinental spread of ASF continued in early 70s, when ASF entered America and 
more specifically: Cuba (1971, 1980), Brazil (1978), the Dominican Republic (1978) and 
Haiti (1979) (9). These outbreaks in Cuba, Malta, Italy, Brazil and the Dominican 
Republic in the 70s, were also considered to be a result of contaminated swill from 
ports and airports being fed to pigs. The outbreak in Brazil was attributed, strange as it 
sounds, to a policeman who served at the international airport in Rio de Janeiro and 
who probably used contaminated leftovers from airline food, offered on international 
flights (of Spain or Portugal possible  origin) to feed his pigs (7). Similarly, the outbreak 
in Sardinia was perhaps the result of contaminated waste that entered the island 
through the port of Cagliari or the military airport and later used to feed pigs (7). With 
the exception of Sardinia where ASF is still endemic since 1978, all of the other 
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countries managed to successfully eradicate the disease. However, Europe didn’t avoid 
the second introduction of ASFV about thirty years later. This second entrance was 
through Georgia, in 2007, possibly via the Port of Poti in contaminated catering waste 
from an international cargo ship emerging from Southeast Africa (7). Since then, ASF 
has spread all through Eastern and Central Europe and more specifically from the 
Caucasus region (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) to the Russian Federation (2007), 
Ukraine (2012), Belarus (2013), Estonia (2014), Latvia (2014), Lithuania (2014), Poland 
(2014) and Moldova (2016).The most recent EU members affected  are Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Hungary Romania and Bulgaria, all with reported cases in wild boar or 
domestic pigs during 2017 or 2018 (8). In fact, in August 2018, Bulgaria confirmed the 
first outbreak of ASF in the country in a small backyard holding with seven pigs, in the 
city of Varna. Furthermore, this first occurrence in Bulgaria was of particular 
importance also for Greece and a cause of great concern for the Greek authorities due 
to the close geographic proximity of the two countries. Surprisingly, a bit later, in 
September 2018, ASF made a considerable jump, entered Central Europe and infected 
large populations of wild boars, in a well-restricted territory in Southern Belgium 
(10).It is estimated that in Belgium’s case the most probable source of ASF 
introduction were contaminated transportation vehicles and other contaminated 
products. (See Figure 3) 
 
Fig. 3:  Transcontinental spread of ASFV -outbreaks in domestic pigs and in wild boar population during 2018 
 
Modified by Source: OIE (Dixon et al, Antiviral Research, Volume 165, May 2019, Pages 34-41) 
(https://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation/Diseasedistributionmap)  1.Dissemination of genotype I virus 
from West Africa to Portugal 2. Spread to other European countries, to South America and the Caribbean. 3. Spread of genotype II 
from the east coast of Africa to Georgia in the Transcaucasus region, in 2007. 4. Dissemination of ASF to the Russian Federation 
and to Eastern Europe, including members of the EU- Dispersal in Poland and Belgium. 5. Dissemination of genotype II to China in 
2018.  ASF cases in domestic pigs: red dots, in wild boar: purple dots. 
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The dispersal of ASF continued and until the end of 2019, the disease was in 
attendance in nine European countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. 
Furthermore, in Europe, from January to early September 2020, totally 876 outbreaks 
were notified in domestic pigs. Amongst EU members, Romania reported the majority 
of new cases, probably because of the high number of small-scale holdings in the 
country. (See Table 1) 
During the same period, 8431 cases of ASF in wild boar have been reported with the 
vast majority of them occurring in Hungary, which surprisingly, has beaten the odds 
and has still not reported any ASF outbreaks amongst domestic pigs. (See Table 2) 
Greece reported the first and fortunately, the only outbreak of ASF in domestic pigs on 
February 2020, followed by successful eradication. (See Figure 4 and Table 1) 
 
 
Figure 4: Map of outbreaks of ASF in Europe in domestic pigs, and in wild boars, reported from January                      
to 10 September 2020. 
 
 
Modified by Source:  ΟΙΕ-Disease information. 
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Table 1: Numbers of confirmed ASF outbreaks reported in domestic pigs (backyard 
and commercial) January 01 – September 10, 2020. (All data from ADNS and OIE.) 
Country Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Total 
Bulgaria 6 5 5 1 0 0 0 1 0 18 
Greece 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 
Lithuania 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
Moldova 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Poland 0 0 1 1 0 3 16 56 7 84 
Romania 93 56 47 30 37 53 92 165 48 621 
Russia 2 2 3 0 2 5 26 50 13 103 
Serbia 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 0 0 12 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 5 16 
Ukraine 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 5 0 14 
Total 102 65 58 35 41 65 149 288 73 876 
Modified by Source: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Animal and Plant Health Agency Advice 




Table 2: Numbers of ASF cases reported in wild boar January 01 – September 10, 
2020. (All data from ADNS and OIE.) 
Country Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Total 
Belgium 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Bulgaria 148 70 63 25 20 14 30 33 9 412 
Estonia 7 5 6 2 2 5 11 4 3 45 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Hungary 425 413 533 777 495 327 251 201 33 3455 
Italy 28 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 
Latvia 44 19 22 18 12 26 36 20 12 209 
Lithuania 38 13 18 15 15 21 26 12 0 158 
Moldova 0 2 15 9 4 0 0 0 0 30 
Poland 559 563 713 461 287 203 131 212 32 3161 
Romania 176 111 99 59 54 45 48 54 13 659 
Russia 13 12 3 1 1 2 6 23 3 64 
Serbia 22 12 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 41 
Slovakia 12 8 30 37 28 10 13 14 5 157 
Ukraine 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Total 1475 1234 1509 1406 918 653 552 573 111 8431 
Modified by Source: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Animal and Plant Health Agency Advice 
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ASF Etiology - ASF Virus characteristics  
1.1. Architectural structure of the ASFV virus 
African Swine Fever Virus (ASFV) is the etiological agent of African swine fever (ASF) 
disease. 
ASF virus (ASFV) is the sole member of the family Asfarviridae, genus Asfivirus and the 
only recognized DNA arbovirus (a name used to characterize viruses that can be 









Modified by Source: FAO 2017, ASF Manual for Veterinarians 
 
ASFV, thanks to its genome, has the capacity to duplicate not only in mammalian but 
also in insect cells. ASFV is a complex, large, multi-layered, double-stranded DNA virus 
with an average diameter of 200 nm (11). The viral particle consists of 54 structural 
proteins. 
The main feature differentiating ASFV from other nucleocytoplasmic large DNA viruses 
(NCLDVs) is precisely this multi-enveloped structure and additionally its icosahedral 
morphology. Indeed, the intracellular virus particle consists of four layers. Starting 
from the inside out, the first one is the nucleoid layer which encloses the virus’s 
genome. The second one, also known as the core shell, is a thick protein layer. This one 
is surrounded by the third layer, an inner lipid envelope. The external fourth layer is 
the icosahedral protein capsid. Extracellular ASFV acquires a further, exterior, fifth 
layer as it buds through the plasma membrane. Nevertheless, the knowledge regarding 
the precise composition of the infectious virus is still incomplete. Actually, this 
information gap represents one of the two major barriers which prevent the 
development of an effective vaccine against ASFV, with the other one being the 
inability to recognize with accuracy which viral proteins are responsible for activating a 
protective immune response in pigs. ASFV attacks monocytes in the blood and the 
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bone marrow (which become macrophages in the tissues after they have left the blood 
circulation) (12). 
Figure 6: Architectural structure of ASFV virus 
 
 
Modified by Source: Science, 01 Nov 2019: 
Vol. 366, Issue 6465, pp. 640-644 
(A)  ASFV virus structure.   Five layers: External membrane, capsid, inner membrane, core shell, nucleoid. The radius and 
thickness of each layer are labeled. (B) Radially colored representations of the ASFV capsid and core shell. (C) Cryo-EM 
reconstruction of the ASFV capsid. (D) Diagrammatic organization of the minor capsid proteins and capsomers . 
 
 
1.2 Genome of the ASFV virus 
ASF virus genome varies in length from about 170 to 193 kbp (kilobase pairs) 
depending on strain and includes hairpin loops and terminal inverted areas (13).More 
specifically, ASFV genome consists of a conserved central region of about 125 kb and 
two variable ends, the left 46-kbp and the right 12.5-kbp ends, encoding five multigene 
families (MGFs): MGF100, MGF110, MGF300, MGF360, and MGF530. MGFs 
classification is based on their average amino acid length and surprisingly they show no 
resemblance to other known genes (13). The genes that determine the virulence of the 
different strains as well as the range of hosts (pigs, wild boar, ticks) are identified in 
these two variable ends.  The size of the genome also depends on these areas. There 
are indications that MGFs are the ones responsible for the extreme antigenic diversity 
of ASFV and consequently for the virus ability to escape from the host’s immune 
response. One the other hand, several genes in MGFs may be connected to host 
protection (8). 
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1.3 Genotypic diversity of ASF virus 
At present, there is only one known serotype of ASFV which includes more than 20 
separate genotypes, characterized by important variations as regards to their 
virulence. Indeed, an ASFV infection can lead to the production of more than 150 
different proteins in the infected macrophages of the host, many of which seem to be 
extremely antigenic and are able to trigger a very strong immune response, followed 
by antibodies production. Although the produced antibodies can be present for some 
considerable time, they don’t act protectively and they can’t eliminate the infection as 
they are not neutralizing. Therefore, identification of different serotypes is not 
feasible. As a result, classification is done with the help of genotyping methods and 
more particularly through the analysis of some genome regions, like the C-terminal 
region of the gene encoding vp72. According to the variations recorded in the C-
terminal region, all the existent strains of ASFV have been assorted into 22 genotypes 
(14). 
Until 2007, ASFV Genotype I was the only one circulating in Europe, America, and the 
Caribbean (15).  ASFV Genotype II strain was the strain which entered Georgia in 2007 
from Southeast Africa, subsequently spread through Eastern Europe and finally 
reached Western Europe via Belgium, in 2018 (15). It should be noted that all the ASFV 
strains, currently isolated in Eastern Europe belong to ASFV Genotype II, which reveals 
a common connection to the Caucasus region (16). From a clinical point of view, it is 
interesting to note, that results from laboratory infections have proven that Genotype 
II strains are highly virulent and provoke the acute form of the disease, with a high 
mortality rate, up to 100% in both domestic pigs and wild boar, regardless of sex, age, 
viral load or infection route (16). 
1.4 Resistance of ASFV to physical and chemical factors. 
The ASF virus is very stable in proteinaceous environments, in excretions of infected 
pigs, pig carcasses, fresh pork meat and a variety of pork products which haven’t 
undergone heat treatment, sufficient enough (right combination of time and 
temperature) to inactivate the virus (17). Indeed, the virus is considerable resistant to 
both low and high temperatures and the minimum requirement for ASFV inactivation 
is heating at 60°C for 20 min or 56°C for 70΄ (17). It has been firmly established that 
ASFV can survive and be infectious up to 140 days in Iberian and Serrano hams, 399 
days in Parma ham, 112 days in Iberian pork loins and can also survive up to 1000 days 
in frozen pork meat (18). On the other hand, ASFV has not been detected in hams that 
have been heat-treated at 70°C (18).As regards to ASFV resistance to substances such 
as acids and bases ,it should be noted that ASF virus is inactivated by pH <3.9 or >11.5 
in serum-free medium. Serum increases considerably ASFV ability to survive. For 
example at pH 13.4 – with no serum present, ASFV survives only up to 21 hours while 
with serum present ASFV can survive and be infectious up to seven days. Disinfection 
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of the environment, surfaces and equipment is a key issue in the fight against ASFV 
and the choice and use of proper disinfectants is a prerequisite. And this is completely 
justified as it has been proven that the virus survives for considerable time periods in 
blood (18 months at 4°C), faeces (11 days at 18-25°C, several months at 4°C) and 
tissues (in carcasses which decompose remains infectious for 3-5 weeks and up to 15 
years in frozen carcasses). Ether and chloroform are appropriate disinfectants for ASFV 
and furthermore inactivation can be achieved by 8/1,000 sodium hydroxide (30 min), 
hypochlorites, 2.3% chlorine (30 min), 3/1,000 formalin (30 min), 3% ortho-
phenylphenol (30 min), iodine compounds (1; 3) and finally by the breakthrough 
oxidative disinfectant of peroxygen-based chemistry, which has proven to 
demonstrate powerful performance against ASFV (5 min). 
 
Clinical forms of ASF and post-mortem findings 
Clinical forms 
The ASF incubation period in natural infections, varies from 3 to 19 days. Although ASF 
is related to high lethality, it is not as infectious as previously believed to be which 
means that it is possible for the disease to disseminate gradually within the flock, and 
some pigs may avoid the infection. ASFV replicates primarily in mononuclear 
phagocytic cells and in particular in monocytes and macrophages and after this initial 
replication, spreads through the blood or the lymphatic system and reaches secondary 
places of replication such as endothelial cells of different tissues, hepatocytes, renal 
tubular epithelial cells (14). ASF is not characterized by pathognomonic lesions, so 
clinical symptoms may be identical to those of other hemorrhagic diseases (8). The 
clinical manifestation of ASF can take different forms, according to the virulence of the 
isolated strain, the host species and breed, the viral load and the infection route and 
also the endemicity status in the area (8). Indeed, the clinical forms of ASF vary from 
peracute (very acute) to asymptomatic (unapparent) (3). ASFV strains are usually 
classified in three main categories: highly, moderately and low virulent. In a previous 
unaffected farm, the infection with a low virulent strain will probably cause only mild 
symptoms such as fever and few deaths with some necrotic-hemorrhagic lymph nodes. 
Generally, and as the viral circulation within the herd increases day by day, the disease 
may be manifested more dramatically with high mortality and characteristic clinical 
signs and lesions. Consequently, as part of the extremely important Passive 
Surveillance, ASF testing should be done with no exceptions to every dead pig that 
presented fever in an epidemiologically high risk region (14). Highly virulent strains 
normally induce peracute, with mortality as high as 100% {pigs die 1-4 days post 
infection (pi)} and acute forms (pigs die 4-9 days pi) of the disease (8).  Moderately 
virulent strains are usually isolated during the occurrence of acute (pigs die 11-15 days 
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pi) and subacute (pigs die after 20 days pi) forms of ASF. Finally, moderate-to- low 
virulent strains have been connected with the chronic form of the disease, with a 
mortality rate less than 20%. In Europe this form has only been described in Spain and 
Portugal, areas in which ASF infection has been endemic (14). 
2.1 Peracute form 
High fever (41-42 °C) followed by sudden deaths within 1-3 days are the two major 
clinical manifestations of the peraute form. Sometimes clinical symptoms such as 
anorexia, lethargy, hyperpnoea and cutaneous hyperemia may be appear but usually 
death occurs suddenly and clinical signs are totally absent (3). 
2.2 Acute form 
This is the most common form of ASF manifestation. Characterized by fever (40-42 °C) 
,inactivity, apathy and a propensity of infected pigs to crowd closely because they are 
cold. The animals look sleepy and weak and they show loss of appetite and increased 
pulse and respiratory rate (14). Death in shock usually follows one week after the 
onset of fever and foaming discharge is generally found around the mouth and nostrils 
(14). Sick pigs develop generalized erythema on the skin due to vascular changes, 
which is more visible on the ears, tail, distal extremities, chest, abdomen and perianal 
area. The same disorders are present in affected wild boar and feral pigs but it’s a lot 
harder to be detected because of their darker skin and thick fur. Similarly, erythema in 
dark-skinned domestic breeds can be overlooked (3). Cyanosis may also be detected 1-
2 days before death mostly on the skin of the ears, abdomen and perianal area. Small 
sites of cutaneous necrosis, usually in infections with moderate virulent strains as well 
as subcutaneous hematomas, may also be observed. Furthermore, mucoid ocular and 
nasal discharge, epistaxis, gastrointestinal symptoms such as abdominal pain, 
vomiting, constipation or diarrhea, which may progress from mucoid to bloody 
(melena), may also be present (14).Additionally, abortion of pregnant sows, caused by 
high fever ,at all stages of pregnancy can be observed (3). In fact, abortion is a sign of 
particular importance as frequently is the first indication of an outbreak. About 90-
100% of pigs demonstrating these symptoms will die in a seven days period (14). Post 
mortem findings are usually of a petechial-hemorrhagic character and the most 
recognizable ones are: a. swollen and totally hemorrhagic, even necrotic in some 
cases, lymph nodes especially the retropharyngeal, gastro hepatic  and renal lymph 
nodes , which often look like blood clots b. characteristic lesions in the spleen which 
appears enlarged with rounded edges, hyperemic or congested ,friable ,with dark-red 
to black color due to congestion and c. petechiae , that is small red or purple 
hemorrhagic spots caused by capillary bleeding ,on the renal capsule (3).Finally, 
serum-bloody fluid can be found in pleural, pericardial, and peritoneal cavities as 
well as  lung congestion (19). 
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Figure 7: Clinical signs of acute ASF 
 
Α : Pigs with fever, crowd closely, trying to stay warm, B to F : erythema –cyanosis of  the skin  on ears, tail, 
extremities, chest, G to I : necrotic lesions on the skin 
Modified by Source: FAO 2017, ASF Manual for Veterinarians 
 
Figure 8: Post-mortem Findings of Acute ASF 
 
A: Swollen, black spleen, B-C: hemorrhagic lymph-nodes, D: petechiae on the kidney surface 
Modified by Source: An Update on the Epidemiology and Pathology of African Swine Fever ,J. M. Sanchez-Vizcaıno , L. Mur , J. C. 
Gomez-Villamandos  and L. Carrasco. 
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2.3 Subacute form 
 Moderately virulent isolates usually cause this form of ASF which basically appears in 
endemic areas such as Eastern Europe, Sardinia and the Iberian Peninsula (8) and is 
generally less severe than the acute form. During the initial stages of the disease as 
well as in the middle of its course, the pigs develop a severe, yet intermittent 
thrombocytopenia resulting in extensive vascular disorders such as bleeding and 
edema (14).The initial symptoms of this form are altered fever that lasts for 2 or 3 
weeks (8) and abortions (14). Mortality ranges between 30% and 70%, while most 
deaths occur, 7-20 days p.i (8). Surviving pigs recover within 3-4 weeks but continue to 
excrete the virus and infect healthy pigs for up to 6 weeks p.i (14). 
 
2.4 Chronic form 
 
Chronic form is caused by low virulent isolates, has no specific clinical signs and is 
characterized mostly by ulcers and necrotic lesions on the skin, on the tonsils and the 
tongue and additional by arthritis (joint swellings, inflammation and lameness). This 
form has been observed in Spain, Portugal and Angola (14). However, has never been 
detected in Africa and Sardinia where the disease has been endemic. Consequently, it 
is presumed that the origin of this form goes back in the 60s and actually it is the result 
of the natural evolution of the ASFV strains used in vaccination attempts that took 
place on the Iberian Peninsula (14). Mortality rates in chronic forms are typically lower 
than 30 % (3).At present the chronic form is not observed (14). 
 
Differential Diagnosis 
The way in which ASF presents itself clinically varies considerably from case to case. In 
fact, diagnosis based only on clinical signs can be problematic throughout the initial 
stages of the disease as well as in the event that only few pigs have been infected. The 
ASF diagnosis is sometimes hypothetical, as signs may be similar with those of other 
swine hemorrhagic diseases (3).The rule is that no diagnosis is definite before 
laboratory confirmation. The differential diagnosis of ASF includes the following swine 
diseases: Classical Swine Fever (CSF), High Pathogenic Porcine Reproductive and 
Respiratory Syndrome (HP-PRRS), Erysipelas, septicaemic Salmonellosis, Porcine 
Dermatitis Nephropathy Syndrome (PDNS), Aujeszkys Disease and Poisoning (3). 
Amongst them, CSF, also reported as hog cholera, represents the most important 
differential diagnosis, as “similar names suggest similar disease characteristics”. 
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Diagnosis 
Laboratory confirmation of ASF is required in order to make an accurate diagnosis. 
Currently, a variety of diagnostic tests is available to detect ASFV genome, virus 
antigen or antibodies against the virus. A correct ASF diagnosis should always include 
both the virus and the antibodies detection (11), because pigs presented with the 
subacute form may have developed antibodies but often show only transient viraemia 
(5).So, whenever there is a suspicion of ASF, samples of serum and blood with 
anticoagulant (EDTA) should be collected as well as samples from the primary organs 
of choice, which are:  spleen, lymph nodes, kidney, lung and bone marrow (14). For 
virus detection, the most frequently used methods are virus isolation and 
haemadsorption (HAD) polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and sequencing, enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for antigen detection and direct 
immunofluorescence. Virus isolation in macrophages and HAD is essential for the 
confirmation of the first ASF case in previously disease-free areas and It is generally 
performed only in reference laboratories (14). PCR technique, (conventional and real-
time PCR, both validated by OIE) is the mostly widely used test, as it is sensitive, 
reliable, rapid and specific. Currently, Real-time PCR is regarded as the “gold standard” 
method for the detection of viral DNA (20). Regarding the available serological tests, 
first of all it is important to point out that pigs that survive within the first days of 
infection develop specific antibodies at significant levels but without complete 
neutralizing ability (5).These specific antibodies are detectable from the first week of 
infection (7-10 days) for up to several months or perhaps years (8). Consequently, and 
in the absence of a vaccine in use ,the detection of anti-ASFV antibodies in the serum is 
without exception a sign of infection (8).In addition, serological screening  is crucial for 
detecting recovered and potential carrier animals in endemic areas with a well-
established ASF infection(14), where attenuated and low virulent virus isolates are also 
circulating(21).The enzyme linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) is generally the 
serological routine method due to its simplicity, relatively low cost and because it can 
be broadly performed for screening purposes. Indirect fluorescent antibody test 
(IFA),Indirect immunoperoxidase test (IPT) and Immunoblotting test (IBT), should be 
carried as confirmatory serological tests to ELISA –positive samples (21). 
 
ASF Epidemiology 
5.1 Natural Hosts 
ASFV infects naturally, domestic pigs (Sus scrofa domesticus) and wild suids, 
including warthogs (Phacochoerus africanus), bushpigs (Potamochoerus larvatus) and  
giant forest hogs (Hylochoerus meinertzhageni) in Africa and also wild boar (Sus scrofa 
ferus) in Eurasia. All of these wild African boars develop asymptomatic infections 
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(because of molecular factors which remain unknown) (8), except from young animals, 
which usually demonstrate an intermittent viraemia . This infection, without obvious 
clinical signs, allows them to behave as asymptomatic carriers and typical ASFV 
reservoirs in Africa. Clinical symptoms solely occur in domestic and feral pigs, as well as 
their close relative, the European wild boar. Except from suids, soft ticks of 
the Ornithodoros species (also known as tampans) can be infected by ASFV over long 
periods of time, and behave as  biological vectors and as virus reservoirs. Amongst 
them, Ornithodoros moubata complex is present in East and South Africa while O. 
erraticus is being found on the Iberian Peninsula and Southern Europe. O.moubata 
shows trans-stadial, transovarial and sexual ASFV transmission, while only trans-stadial 
transmission has been observed with O. erraticus. It is believed that due to infected 
Ornithodoros ticks, ASFV infection can remain in an area for up to five years (8). 
Experimental studies have shown that all Ornithodoros species are capable of 
transmitting ASFV, including O. moubata, O. porcinus, O. erraticus, O. coriaceus. 
Ornithodoros turicata and O. savignyi (8), making the ASF virus the only recognized 
DNA virus that can be transmitted by arthropod vectors. The thorough geographical 
circulation of Ornithodoros ticks is not well known, making it hard to estimate the 
possible involvement of ticks in the ongoing ASF outbreaks mainly in Europe and 
mainly in terms of virus transmission, maintenance and dissemination(8). In East Africa 
the virus is preserved in an ancient sylvatic cycle which includes warthogs and O. 
moubata soft ticks that reside in their burrows (4). (See Figure 9) 
Figure 9: ASFV hosts 
 
Modified by Source: FAO 2017, ASF Manual for Veterinarians 
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1.3 Epidemiological cycles 
Generally, three factors shape the epidemiology of ASF. The type of host: domestic 
pigs or wild boar, the presence or absence of Ornithodoros ticks and the type of 
husbandry, inside or outside farming. Until now, three independent epidemiologic 
cycles have been reported in affected countries: sylvatic, tick–pig, and domestic 
(Figure 10). The first one, which is also the most complicated, has been observed in 
East and South Africa, where domestic pigs, wild suids and ticks coexist. In the sylvatic 
cycle, ASFV circulates between warthogs and soft ticks, which are actually the natural 
reservoirs of the virus but without inducing any clinical signs to the warthogs. The 
sylvatic cycle represents actually the origin of the other two, and therefore the origin 
of ASF as a disease (5). The second type, the tick-pig cycle has been observed on the 
Iberian Peninsula, where ASF had been constantly present during the epidemic in the 
‘60s and ‘70s of the past century. In this cycle, ticks act as a reservoir for the virus 
which is mainly transmitted amongst domestic pig .The third-domestic cycle is 
observed in currently affected European countries and does not include soft ticks but 
only domestic pigs. In this cycle, which is the one most commonly observed in 
outbreaks around the world, the virus is transmitted either directly amongst domestic 
pigs, or indirectly from contaminated pig products to domestic pigs. In this cycle, ticks 
as natural viral reservoirs are not included.  Yet, the involvement of Ornithodoros ticks 
in Eastern Europe outbreaks cannot be ruled out with certainty as a lot of scientists 
have recorded the existence of these ticks between the 1930s and the 1960s (8).           
(See Figure 10) 
Figure 10: The ASF epidemiological cycles 
 
Modified by Source: FAO 2017, ASF Manual for Veterinarians 
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However, the epidemiological model observed in the ongoing ASF outbreaks in Central 
and Eastern Europe, does not fit any of the three mentioned above. Firstly, because it 
is believed that in many cases, the disease was introduced into previously ASF-free 
areas through the movements of infected wild boar. And secondly, because wild boar 
seems to be the most seriously afflicted host, which reveals a significant involvement 
of wild boar in the  ASF dissemination and persistence (5).Indeed, wild boars can move 
long distances through wildlife passages  and cross  borders unhindered thus adding to 
the virus dissemination in long distances and of course serving also as a reservoir for 
the infection of domestic pigs (4).Finally, the fact that wild boar population and pig 
holdings, frequently the small ones of very poor biosafety standards, coexist in some 
areas, seems to have significantly favored direct contacts between the two hosts and 
therefore fostered ASF transmission. What is not a matter of doubt is that the 
involvement of wild boar in virus transmission, spread and persistence in Eastern 
Europe should be further investigated. Indeed, despite the fact that many reports 
indicate that generally wild boar avoid feeding on sick animals of the same species, the 
maintenance and dissemination of ASF in an area is thought to be largely due to the 
presence of infected carcasses of wild boar combined with the instinctive scavenging 
behavior amongst wild boar population (8). So, at this time, an additional 
epidemiological cycle which includes Eurasian wild boar (Sus scrofa), the wild boar 
habitat and contaminated carcasses is also suggested. In this cycle, known as the wild 
boar-habitat cycle, both direct transmission between wild boar and indirect 
transmission via the contaminated habitat is possible. The persistence of the virus in 
the wild boar natural reserves and the possibility of new infections depend on many 
parameters such as landscape, season of the year, time needed for carcasses 
decomposition and climatic conditions (low temperature and high humidity act in 
favor of the virus) (5).  
Finally, the investigation of the possible epidemiological role of other potential vectors 
should by a key point for the understanding and the effective handling of ASF (8). It is 
worth mentioning that experimental studies have shown that Stomoxys flies can act as 
mechanical carriers of the virus (up to 3 days according to Greek ASF experts) thus 
contributing to ASFV transmission. However, flies collected on ASF-affected farms in 
Lithuania were ASFV negative (22). The virus has also been found in Haematopinus 
suis, (pig lice common in regions with mild climate), collected from experimentally 
infected domestic pigs. As regards to  rodents and birds, which are also believed to be 
able to carry mechanically the virus, blood samples collected from these species on 
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5.3 Transmission of ASF virus 
5.3.1 The role of animals 
ASF infection can occur directly or indirectly. Directly through contact of healthy pigs 
with infected pigs and indirectly through contact with contaminated pork products or 
contaminated fomites (e.g., clothing, equipment, vehicles, boots). The most common 
route of direct infection is the oral-nasal route (infection occurs in the closest lymph 
nodes, the pharyngeal mucosa and tonsils) (20), followed by infection through skin 
abrasions and through contact with blood (in which virus is being found in very high 
levels), and other secretions and excretions including feces, urine and saliva, from 
infected animals (8).Indirectly, by ingestion of waste food containing , unheated, 
contaminated pork (19), by ingestion of other infected material on contaminated 
surfaces, contaminated feed (grain, soya ) or water(4). Airborne transmission is 
considered possible but only over short distances (3-5 Km according to ASF Greek 
experts), unlike swine flu for example (4). ASFV excretion period varies from 1 to 7 
days (pi) and depends mainly on the strain and the route of infection (23). In acutely 
infected swine, all body fluids and tissues contain large loads of infectious virus from 
the onset of clinical signs until death, with the highest virus titers being reported, as 
previously mentioned in blood and the oral-nasal discharge, while lower titers are 
being found in the conjunctival  and in the genital discharge (19). Virus excretion 
through feces may be continuous, with large amounts of ASFV during the acute and 
sub-acute phase or periodic with small viral amounts (23). ASFV release period in pigs 
that recover is less clear and generally there are knowledge gaps regarding the virus 
excretion after the first thirty days of infection (23). However studies have reported 
the presence of infectious virus in blood up to 456 days pi, in tissues up to 180 days pi 
and viral DNA in leukocytes up to 500 days pi (23).  
5.3.2 The role of humans 
It is absolutely certain that human-caused dissemination of ASFV plays a key role in the 
epidemiology of ASF. There is also the somewhat radical position, that ASF is a “man-
made disease, mostly as a result of human misbehavior”. Indeed, in a world where 
people, animals and goods move globally, global markets demand an increase in 
international trade at all levels. But, the increasing movement, both official and 
unofficial, of live pigs and pig products, not only pig meat, but also manure, semen, 
embryos, hide e.t.c, increases the likelihood of pigs being exposed to  various TAD 
infection agents, such as the ASF virus. Wild boar population is the one most likely to 
be involved in illegal trade. Indeed, there are reports concerning illegal wild boar 
movements, like those in Italy since the 1950’s, in Spain originating from France and 
also in Bulgaria, which reportedly seized in 2014 from Poland ,a cargo of live wild boar 
for hunting reasons (7).Undoubtedly, human activity, being accompanied by human 
negligence, can contribute to  ASFV spread over short and long distances. Indeed, 
illegal importation of meat, through a broad range of pathways such as sea freight, air 
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freight, air passenger baggage, road transportation, even by post, represents the most 
common mode  of ASF introduction in a previously “ASF free “area (7). All of these  
illegal actions can be grouped into two main categories depending on the intentions of 
the people involved: a)the import of considerable quantities, greater than the ones 
permitted by legislation, for commercial reasons and b) the unofficial import, just for 
personal consumption (in travellers personal baggage)(7). All travelers should be 
informed at the points of entry in a country that they are banned to carry in their 
personal baggage fresh or frozen pig meat, sausages, ham e.t.c. The virus survives for 
considerable time in several pork products and thus, their feeding to domestic pigs 
(food/kitchen waste), which is a very common practice in the backyard sector, despite 
being prohibited in the E.U, can cause the spread of the disease. Heating procedures 
inactivate the virus, thus well cooked meat does not constitute a danger to pig’s 
health. However, other methods of meat processing in relatively low temperatures, 
such as air-drying or smoking, do not kill ASFV, that is the meat remains infectious for a 
long time(4).Apart from pig meat and pig meat products, other contaminated 
materials that harbor the virus such as clothing, boots, pen equipment, drinking and 
feeding troughs , transportation  vehicles ,can also contribute to ASFV dissemination 
and transmission (4).Furthermore, it is important to emphasize once more that 
generally, the majority of ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs occur in backyard farms, 
characterized by low biosecurity measures and in general, outdated husbandry 
practices. Access to backyard farms is usually open to visitors without restrictions and 
animals are moved around without precautions, for sale and breeding reasons. 
Moreover, pigs are not always kept fully enclosed in these holdings which most 
commonly are not officially registered and farmers are not easy to identify (24).In 
addition, the visible danger of not receiving compensation for losses due to 
eradication, very often prevents the farmers from reporting ill pigs and disease signs 
and “pushes” them to emergency selling or slaughter of pigs thus resulting in further 
disease spread(24).Finally, apart from the farmers, hunters and hunting gear 
potentially infected by hunted sick wild boar, including boots , ropes, clothing, hooks, 
knives, vehicles e.t .c ,play a major role in the dissemination and  indirect transmission 
of ASFV and in general in the epidemiology of ASF , role which will be discussed more 
thoroughly  later in this paper. 
Social-economic impact of ASF 
Until today there is no treatment for ASF nor effective vaccine in use for the 
prevention of the disease, thus leaving, in case of an outbreak, “stamping out” policies 
for the eradication of the disease and implementation of very strict sanitary measures, 
such as trade bans, export restrictions, control of animal movements and animal 
quarantine (8), the only effective control approach with unfortunately, serious, 
economic consequences. Indeed, despite the fact that ASF is not transmitting to 
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humans, it has an enormous social-economic impact mainly in countries where the pig 
sector holds an important position in terms of meat supply as well as in those where 
live pigs, pork and pork products account for a significant share of their export and 
economic potential(8). Indeed, ASF may result to a supply and a demand shock in the 
pig market at national and international level, shock which depends on parameters 
such as the extent and duration of the outbreak and the reflexes and responses of 
trade partners (25).ASF can be proven catastrophic for the industrialized pig farming 
due to huge losses in livestock and enormous financial losses but can also affect the 
way of living, and limit the income and the purchasing potential of traditional-backyard 
farmers (24).Indeed, an  ASF outbreak, even a small one, constitutes a  major sanitary 
risk, so ,countries importing  pigs or pig products  may suspend all imports  from the 
areas where ASF is present or an outbreak has been occurred, until the sanitary risk is 
addressed (25). ASF has a dramatic effect on the international and national pig trade 
and has been proven to reduce export quantity, pork production, the price of pig meat 
and the national pig inventory (“production capacity”) in the country where it has been 
detected. For example, ASF drove Bulgaria’s total 2019 swine inventory down by 25 % 
and the number of swine farms by 74 % (26).At the same time the cost of pork 
production increases dramatically and according to ASF Greek experts, the ultimate 
cost multiplies by 200%.Exports seem to be the sector most affected compared to 
production and prices, and the consequences may be delayed depending on the 
reaction of the meat industry and its ability, in short and long term, to adjust the 
supply (25). Overall, pig meat markets can react variously to the entrance of ASF into a 
country. On average, depending mostly on the size and the duration of the epidemic, 
the new outbreaks of ASF can reduce pork exports by up to 15% in the first year after 
occurrence, production quantity by more than 4%, and national pig inventory by 3–4% 
both in the current and the next year (25). Furthermore, despite the fact that ASF does 
not endanger human health, there is always the possibility that an ASF outbreak and a 
lack of scientific information could affect negatively, consumer’s preferences regarding 
pork consumption. Moreover, apart from the industrialized pig farming, about 43% of 
all farmers engaged in pig production worldwide, operate in backyard holdings and 
their production is completely independent of the official markets(7). Small-scale 
farming is a quite usual, well established practice in rural areas in many European 
states. It serves as a basic or even as the exclusive source of meat for the countryside 
residents and usually elicits a helpful, secondary cash income, an important financial 
safety net (24). For example, In Poland, which counts a big number of small-scale 
holdings, pig producers are tackling a vast drop in their income due to ASF which, in 
some areas appears as high as 40%(27). Unfortunately, the backyard farms, 
characterized by low biosecurity standards are often ignored by national authorities, 
who pay closer attention to the large scale commercial pig farms (7).In Greece, 
understaffing of veterinary authorities contributes greatly to this situation of neglect 
and perhaps even abandonment of the backyard holdings which appear extremely 
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exposed to ASFV entrance and represent a constant threat for the safety of the 
industrial sector (24). For all of these reasons, all the parties economically involved are 
extremely worried about the threat of ASF for the EU and funding from the EU, as an 
additional support measure has been given to several members (8), although the 
economic damage varies from country to country depending on factors such as export 
direction and the grade of development of the pig industry (25). 
Control-Eradication and Prevention of ASF 
7.1 Control measures-Legal framework in Europe 
The most effective way to successfully fight ASF is to ensure that the virus never enters 
a country. All the E.U members are very keen to keep their doors closed to the virus. 
Indeed, the European Union has adopted a common policy to control ASF and has laid 
down prevention and control measures to be applied where ASF is suspected or 
confirmed either in holdings, commercial or backyard, or in wild boars. These include 
information measures and measures to prevent and eradicate the disease. The main 
piece of legislation providing the tool for the control of African swine fever in the EU 
is Council Directive 2002/60/EC of 27 June 2002(28), laying down specific provisions 
for the control of African swine fever, accompanied by the Commission Decision of 26 
May 2003 approving an African swine fever diagnostic manual (notified under 
document number C (2003) 1696). In this framework, the latest specific regionalization 
measures that have been taken with respect to evolution of the ASF situation in the EU 
are included in Commission Implementing Decision of 9 October 2014 
(2014/709/EU) (as latest amended by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 
2020/2128 of 16 December 2020(29). This Decision establishes animal health control 
measures on the movement, dispatch of pigs and certain pig products, and marking 
pork meat from the areas at risk of infection in order to prevent the spread of ASF to 
other areas of the Union. Affected Member States and territories are listed in four 
different parts of the Annex to the Decision according to their epidemiological 
situation and level of risk and the ones that are listed in Part IV have a higher risk of 
spread of ASF than the ones listed in Part I. It is important to point out  that this 
Decision is also intended to avoid unneeded disturbance to trade within the EU as well 
to trade by third countries and the provisions of this Decision are in coordination with 
the OIE standards (30)Apart from the above framework, of special importance is 
the working document SANTE/7112/2015, that has been developed in order to clarify 
the principles and criteria for geographically and temporally defining ASF 
regionalization.  The main criteria for demarcating Parts I, II, III and IV of the Annex to 
Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU are (31):  
1) Part IV: occurrence of ASF in both domestic pigs and wild boar. The disease control 
presents specific challenges due to the systemic and high level non-compliance by 
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stakeholders (e.g. the farming sector) with the relevant EU requirements, in particular 
in relation to identification, registration and traceability of pigs and there are certain 
difficulties for the veterinary authorities to ensure the conformity with those 
requirements. 
2) Part III: occurrence of ASF in both domestic pigs and wild boar (or in domestic pigs 
only provided the lack of surveillance data to justify the absence of ASF infection in 
wild boar). 
3) Part II: occurrence of ASF only in wild boar. 
4) Part I: higher risk area with no cases, nor outbreaks, of ASF and where higher 
surveillance (in particular passive) is applied adjacent to a Part II, III or IV (31)                       
In addition, document SANTE/7113/2015 summarizes the Strategic approach to the 
management of ASF for the EU. This strategic approach was developed and updated 
taking also into account the latest findings from EFSA. (28) 
The Council Directive 2002/60/EU which establishes the minimum measures to be 
applied within the EU for the control of ASF, includes totally 30 articles and among 
them a special reference should be made to the following (28): 
 Article 3 ASF notification 
 Article 4 Measures in cases where the presence of ASF on a holding is 
suspected. 
 Article 5 Measures in cases where the presence of ASF on a holding is 
confirmed. 
 Article 6 Measures in cases where the presence of ASF is confirmed in holdings 
consisting of various production units. 
 Article 7 Measures in contact holdings. 
 Article 8 Epidemiological inquiry. 
 Article 9 Establishment of protection and surveillance zones. 
 Article 10 Measures in the established protection zone. 
 Article 11 Measures in the established surveillance zone. 
 Article 12 Cleansing, disinfection and treatment with insecticides. 
 Article 13 Repopulation of pig holdings following disease outbreaks. 
 Article 14 Measures in cases where ASF is suspected or confirmed in a 
slaughterhouse or means of transport. 
 Article 15 Measures in cases where ASF is suspected or confirmed in feral pigs. 
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 Article 16 Plans for the eradication of ASF from a feral pig population. 
 Article 17 Measures to prevent the spread of ASF virus by means of vectors. 
 Article 18 Diagnostic procedures and bio-safety requirements. 
 Article 20 Community controls. 
 Article 21 Contingency plans. 
 Article 22 Disease control centers and expert groups (28). 
Briefly, the Directive requires that Member States develop and implement an early 
warning system in the event of ASF entrance (any delay can result in greater disease 
spread) and also a Contingency plan for the eradication of the disease (30). In general, 
the Directive lays down the measures to be taken in the infected holding, the infected 
area and the provisions to apply on the holdings of that area. Control and eradication 
measures include: Establishment of protection (with a radius of at least three 
kilometers around the outbreak site,) and surveillance zones (of a radius of at least 10 
kilometers.)(28),enhanced epidemiological surveillance, epidemiological investigation, 
tracing of pigs, and most importantly, stamping out in infected holdings (immediate 
slaughter of all pigs, infected and potentially infected in-contact pigs, followed by safe 
burial or burning of carcasses and other infected materials, cleansing and disinfection 
of infected premises). Stamping out seems to be the most cost-effective eradication 
method and allows countries to declare freedom from ASF in the shortest time. These 
measures are applied in combination with strict quarantine to contain the disease, 
biosecurity measures on pig holdings and animal and pork-product movement control 
(30).The above measures should be accompanied by extensive public-awareness 
campaigns, training and informing of all the stakeholders on the risks related to ASF. 
7.2 Prevention of ASF 
There is no magic or single recipe for preventing ASF. Biosafety-Biosecurity is the key 
and also an investment in a long term. Indeed, for every euro we spend on biosafety, 
we earn back sixteen, according to Greek ASF experts. Biosafety is the combination of 
all measures taken by producers and government authorities (containment principles, 
technologies and practices) to reduce the risk of unintentional introducing, and 
spreading diseases. It is essentially a chain of interconnected measures which remains 
effective as long as its weakest link remains strong. Biosafety takes place at every level, 
from herd to region, to country. Success depends on many factors due that risk factors 
are unique for each holding and mainly depends on the epidemiological situation, on 
farm location and closeness to other farms, type of farm (confined, outdoor, 
backyard),type of production and technology used, on staff, animal movements 
including wild boar population and sanitary status of animals to be replaced (8).That’s 
why E.U prevention strategy is adapted to the specificity of each country member 
(32).Disappointingly, knowledge gaps in “biosecurity” and “surveillance” ,among pig 
  -29- 
producers and authorities, were identified as two out of four major gaps ,with “wild 
boar” and “ASFV transmission” being the other two, in ASF prevention, during an 
extensive on line survey(33). Pig farming systems are classified as: (i) “commercial 
farms” which are the farms that sell pigs, send pigs to a slaughterhouse or move pig 
products off the holding, (ii) “outdoor pig farms” which are the farms in which pigs are 
kept temporarily or permanently outdoor, and (iii) “non-commercial farms” which are 
the farms where pigs are kept only for fattening for own consumption and neither pigs 
nor any of their products leave the holding. The last type is also known as “family 
farms” or “backyard farms”. Moreover, “feral pig” or “free-ranging pig” means a pig 
which is not kept or bred on a holding (32). With relation to Biosafety, we need to 
identify the most effective measures for preventing the entrance of ASF into a country, 
region or farm as well the minimum biosecurity measures needed for different farming 
systems. 
7.2.1 Key measures on Commercial farms 
 
The impact of ASF on commercial farms which are considerably bigger in size and 
population of pigs, can be enormous (30).Ideally the farm should be located within a 
radius of at least 5 km away from other farms and slaughterhouses. All, pigs should be 
kept enclosed, in a way that ensures that there is no possibility for direct or indirect, 
contact with pigs coming from other farms or with free-ranging pigs nor with wild boar 
(as well as any contact with any part of the carcass of feral pigs/wild boar, including 
hunted or dead wild boar/meat/by-products) (32), thus all animals should be 
accommodated in a biosecure barrier facility. Fencing is needed and should go down to 
a sufficient depth (0,5m.) to prevent escape or entrance of stray pigs via burrowing. 
Fencing should also be of sufficient height (2,5m, with a concrete wall of 0, 5 high at 
minimum) (34).The fenced area should be kept locked and access should be restricted. 
An electric 4-wire fence can provide additional security. Unfortunately, inadequate, of 
poor construction quality fences mostly due to high construction cost, constitute one 
of the most important biosecurity problems in Greek commercial farms. Furthermore, 
clear clean/dirty areas should be established for staff including changing rooms and 
showers and suitable protective clothing is needed also for visitors (30), (veterinarians, 
drivers, sellers) which are reduced to a minimum number. A key measure is to review 
logistical arrangement for entry of new animals and proper separation between 
production unites. This measure will allow for the adequate identification of critical 
control points, which is particularly relevant since contaminated vehicles transporting 
pigs or carcasses are associated to a high risk of disease transmission (30). “All in-all 
out” system which avoids that animals of different ages come into contact and "cuts 
off" the infection cycles, is the ideal, most safe production system. Unfortunately in 
Greece, it is implemented only by 10% of the commercial holdings. A key point is a 
good protocol for pig transport and all kind of deliveries to the farm, another weak 
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point of the Greek- pig farming reality. Ideally, all deliveries of pigs, feed, and 
equipment should be done without the trucks entering the farm. If not feasible, 
decontamination of vehicles and disinfection of driver’s footwear is necessary before 
entering the premises and again before getting back into the truck (30).Furthermore, 
parking spaces should be designed in a way that cross-contamination between workers 
and farm vehicles can be avoided. When trucks need to enter the farm, then loading 
and unloading areas should be placed at least 20 m away from animal buildings. 
Cleaning and disinfection of vehicles should be done before and after each use. 
Furthermore, 48 h quarantine should be applied before the next loading of pigs. Newly 
arrived pigs, that have undergone all the necessary tests, purchased from reliable 
suppliers, should be kept in quarantine areas, placed at least 50m away from the herd, 
for 30 to 60 days (30).Furthermore, pig identification and control of animal 
movements is essential as well as cleaning and disinfection of stables and equipment 
(avoid using borrowed or used equipment). Moreover, an efficient program for 
treating rodents, insects and pests is essential. Many Greek farmers use cats to fight 
rodents, which is actually an option of increased risk as cats, especially when they 
leave the premises, can mechanically transfer the virus. Finally, staff must comply with 
a set of food rules (eating only in dining room, never give kitchen waste to the pigs) 
and personal hygiene rules. Workers should not keep pigs at home or have contact 
with pigs within 48h after hunting (32).Pig farmers should be informed on how to 
recognize the signs of ASF ,ensure the implementation of biosecurity measures and 
report immediately and in priority any suspicious sign or unusual death. 
7.2.2 Key measures on Non-commercial farms 
All pigs should be kept enclosed in buildings, built in a way that no feral pigs or other 
animals (e.g. dogs, cats, birds) can enter the stable. Frequent cleaning and disinfection 
of the stable , changing of footwear and clothing before entering the stable, no 
Kitchen-waste feeding, safe storage of feed(grains and grass), safe removal of animal 
by-products, treatment of pigs with ectoparasites and insecticides, no pig slaughtering 
on the farm(slaughter restricted only to  official slaughterhouses) are some of the 
minimum required measures. In case the farmer is also a hunter should wait 48 h after 
hunting to visit his pigs (30). Finally, official registration of all backyard holdings, pig 
identification and traceability during movements is required and this is another major 
problem in Greece as veterinary authorities, as a general rule, face the unwillingness 
and noncooperation of the small farmers regarding registration in the Integrated 
Veterinary Information System.  
Sanctions, administrative and financial fines for all type of pig holdings not fulfilling 
biosecurity measures are provided by National Law (L.4235/2014). 
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7.2.3 Key measures on Outdoor farms 
 
Free-range management practices in community areas have been recognized as a 
crucial risk factor for the maintenance and reappearance of ASF in endemic areas. 
During free-ranging, there is an increased chance that pigs might come into direct 
contact with pigs from other holdings or wild boar in the area. This is the reason why 
free-range management practices have been banned in shared areas or public forest 
where biosecurity measures and systematic veterinary controls cannot be 
implemented (30). In Greece, according to the relative Ministerial Decision which has 
been issued on March 2018, all the free-range pigs should be kept strictly confined in 
fenced areas and this is the minimum requirement. Ideally, double fencing may be 
placed and also an electrical fence may provide a suitable final barrier. (See Figure 11) 
 
Figure 11: Free range pigs confined in appropriate fenced area close to Greek-Bulgarian borders                        
Source: Personal image archive. 
 
 
7.2.4 Key measures during hunting 
 
Hunting practices should be adapted to the epidemiological evolution of ASF due to 
their effects on the wild boar populations (32). When dealing with ASF in wild boar the 
main task is to reduce the virus load in the environment (35) .Hunters should be 
informed on their obligation to report as a matter of priority the finding of carcasses or 
sick wild boar, especially in newly affected areas. Usually first found carcasses do not 
represent the first cases of the disease in that area, therefore it is a need to enhance 
Passive Surveillance and testing of all carcasses (32). Proper management of hunted 
animals during, transportation, dressing and gutting in authorized dressing facilities, is 
absolutely crucial, followed by chlorination and ideally, burial of the entrails. In 
addition, storage of game meat until testing should be done properly in refrigerators, 
away from feed or other animals. As a general rule, hunted wild boar should remain in 
the hunting area until tested for ASF and only negative ones can be released (35). After 
hunting, cleaning and disinfection of vehicles, knifes, footwear and other equipment 
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should be done thoroughly. Hunters should not enter pig farms at least for the next 
48h.Hunters have a key role as they contribute to the gradual reduction of the wild 
boar population in ASF free-areas and also during Passive and Active surveillance. In 
Greece, the most prominent problem regarding hunting and biosecurity is the 
“traditional habit” of some hunters to transport the game, on the hood of their car, as 
a trophy. Behaviors that can be proven extremely dangerous as large amounts of blood 
are being released on the way and in case of ASF infection further spread of the 
disease in the area is inevitable. A widespread campaign and a good communication 
plan could lead to a change in attitude and mentality of the hunters. Indeed, Greek 
hunters, especially after the outbreak of ASF in Greece and judging by personal 
experience, seem to be open to useful suggestions. 
 
The first Outbreak of African Swine Fever in Greece - A Case Report 
 
8.1 A brief history  
 
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) produced a Risk Assessment on the 
potential spread of ASF in the south‐eastern countries of Europe, adopted on 27 
September 2019 and first published in the EFSA journal on 5 November 2019. This 
scientific opinion concluded that given the prevalence of the disease in Southern 
Bulgaria, there was a very high probability (66-100%) that ASF will spread to other 
Balkan countries within the following 12 months. The report identified nine countries 
in that region at high risk, including Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia and Greece.(33)The EFSA assessment 
,was unfortunately confirmed in the case of  Servia, which  actually reported, on 13 
August 2019, outbreaks of ASF in Rabrovac (village Sume), in Velika Krsna and in 
Kusadak. Furthermore, The EFSA risk assessment also examined the possibility of 
spread of ASF from the Balkan region to the rest of the EU and concluded that the risk 
was very low to low (0-15%)(36). 
Regarding Greece, until the end of 2019, no cases of ASF had been reported in the 
country. ASF has been circulating in wild boar in Bulgaria for several months but 
surveillance carried out by the Greek authorities has not reported any evidence of the 
disease in the wild boar population. Nevertheless, in November 2019, because of the 
increased number of ASF outbreaks, in neighboring Bulgaria, very close to the Greek 
borders, Greek veterinary authorities in collaboration with the E.C ,decided to take 
preventive action and included areas, of estimated high risk, of regional Units in North 
Greece and particularly of Serres, Drama, Xanthi, Rodopi and Evros ,located within a 
radius of 20 kilometers from the Greek-Bulgarian borders ,in Annex 1 of the 
Implementing Decision 709/2014/EC as Part 1 areas (37). 
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8.2 African Swine Fever in a small, noncommercial farm in Regional Unit of Serres. 
8.2.1 ASF confirmation 
African Swine Fever was confirmed for the first time in Greece on 5 February 2020 in a 
small, non-commercial holding of 32 pigs, in the rural area of Nikokleia village of 
Municipality of Vissaltia, in the Regional Unit of Serres, in the Region of Central 
Macedonia, approximately 50Km from the Bulgarian border. The suspicion of the 
disease was posed on 3 February 2020 and was confirmed by the National Reference 
Laboratory (NRL) in Athens, on the afternoon of 5 February 2020.The evening of the 
same day , the Greek authorities reported the outbreak to the ADNS system ,followed 








8.2.2 Epidemiological investigation 
 
Outbreak investigation was performed by the local Veterinary Department in Serres, as 
required by EU legislation. Farm facility was inspected and information by the farmer 
was thoroughly collected. According to the epidemiological investigation, there were 
two different subunits in the holding, linked together epidemiologically as well as 
physically. (38).The Subunit one (1), consisted of the stable, that is the pain were the 
pigs were housed and the Subunit two (2) which was actually an olive grove nearby, 
surrounded only by electric fence (according to the farmer the fence was placed  at the 
same time as the pigs) (38). 
 
 The first subunit included 29 pigs of different categories: 4 sows, 1 boar, 13 piglets and 
11 fattening pigs. As reported by the farmer, on 5 January 2020 a number of fattening 
pigs were moved from the pain to the olive grow for grazing (38). Gradually, three of 
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them died. More particularly, about ten days later, approximately on 15 January, one 
of the pigs in the olive grow died, after showing clinical signs of lethargy, diarrhea and 
reduced feed intake (38). The farmer thought at that time that the death as well as the 
symptoms was caused by the change in food (grazing). However, a week later another 
pig died after showing similar clinical signs. Finally, after 3-4 days, a third pig was found 
dead and this was the one laboratory tested. Samples from the third pig were sent to 
the NRL in Athens on 4 February 2020 and tested positive in Real-time PCR, 
conventional PCR, IPT and ELISA Ag (38). 
8.2.3 Implementation of the Contingency Plan for ASF 
 
Immediately after the confirmation of the outbreak, all measures according to the 
National and EU legislation were taken, that is all measures of the Contingency plan for 
ASF (as well as the Council Directive 2002/60/EC) and of the Commission Decision 
concerning the African swine fever diagnostic manual. 
In the infected holding, all of the remaining pigs were culled under official supervision 
on 6 February 2020. The culled animals were buried in a pit within the farms premises 
according to good sanitary practice. 
Stables, the ground surface and all potentially contaminated roads were cleaned and 
disinfected by local veterinary authorities. The same applied for all involved vehicles 
and equipment that were used during culling. 
Blood samples, were taken from 31 pigs and sent to NRL in Athens. The majority of 
fatteners, 12 out of 13 gave positive Real-time PCR. Positive ELISA for Abs gave 2 out of 
31 samples and 1 out of 31 was inconclusive. Positive ELISA for Ag gave 7 out of 30 
samples. All the other samples were tested negative (38). 
 
Furthermore, extended Protection and Surveillance Zones were defined as regards to 
the legislation and the Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/209 of 14 February 2020 as 
shown below (39): 
 
 
Table 3: Protection and Surveillance Zone (39) 
Greece Areas  
Protection zone Municipality of Visaltias (Serres Regional Unit) 
 
Surveillance zone In Thessaloniki Regional Unit: — Municipality of 
Lagada, — Municipality of Volvis. 
 In Serres Regional Unit: — Municipality of Iraklia, — 
Municipality of Serron, — Municipality of Amfipolis, — 
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All the anticipated control measures according to the European and National 
legislation were rigorously implemented in the established zones as well as in the rest 
of the country. To name but a few, official veterinarians conducted an inventory and 
clinical examination of pigs of all holdings in the established zones. In the protection 
zone the movement and transport of pigs on public or private roads was prohibited. 
Blood samples were taken and sent to the lab and more particularly, 167 samples from 
35 holdings in the Protection zone (100% of the holdings in that area) and 673 samples 
from 62 holdings in the Surveillance zone (51, 6% of the holdings in that area). All 
samples were tested negative (40) and consequently they demonstrated with a degree 
of confidence of 95%,absence of detection of seroprevalence of ASF in the above 
zones at a rate greater than or equal to 10%(40). 
 Furthermore, 11 samples from animals that were found dead in different holdings 
(Passive Surveillance) were also tested negative. Consequently, no new cases of ASF 
were detected or reported, further spread of the disease was avoided and fortunately, 
successful eradication of ASF from Greece was accomplished. Indeed on 15 April 2020, 
all the imposed, restrictive, measures were lifted. Greece was ASF-free (41). 
 
 
8.2.4 Potential Introduction pathways 
 
Determining the source of an ASF outbreak is never easy. According to OIE public 
disease reports the origin of infection is only identified in 4,6% of outbreaks, with the 
rest being reported as unknown (74,9%),left blank(17,6%),under investigation(1,8%) or 
as a combination of sources(1%)(7).As regards to the presented case in Greece, the 
definitive determination of the introduction route of ASF remains unclear and basically 
two scenarios are present. The first one, which is also the one with the highest 
probability, is that the anthropogenic factor played the major role for the indirect 
introduction of the disease through, cross-border movements of people and contact of 
pigs to transferred, contaminated food. Indeed, following investigation in the farm-
olive grow an official highly qualified vet of the local Veterinary department of Serres, 
pointed out the presence of kitchen/food leftovers, probably thrown there by foreign 
people, working in a greenhouse nearby the olive-grow (38). The second, although less 
probable, risk factor for the introduction of the disease was the likely link of the farm 
to infected wild boar (direct or indirect contact with wild boar environment).Truly, the 
presence of wild boar has been reported in that area and one cannot rule out the 
possible access of infected wild boar in the olive grow, before the placement of the 
electric fence or even the contamination of crops of surrounding fields used later as 
feed. The farmer stated that even though, no swill or kitchen waste was fed to the 
animals, he used feed (corn) from local producers (38).  
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History has taught us that all the major epidemics in the domestic pig sector, started 
from a small-scale holding with low biosecurity level. In the Nikokleia outbreak, 
anthropogenic factors are seen as the highest risk for disease introduction. Despite the 
fact that further outbreaks were expected to follow this initial report, they did not. 
Greek veterinary authorities had an excellent cooperation with all pig farmers, who 
demonstrated during that extremely difficult time, remarkable discipline and 
compliance with all the corresponding requirements of the authorities. ASF was 
effectively contained, controlled and eradicated from the country during a very 





African swine fever is one of the most devastating, transboundary diseases of pigs 
and a very serious financial threat to the pig farming sector globally. Biosafety is the 
key to the prevention and the control of the disease. Surveillance programs, 
particularly an intensive Passive surveillance with sampling and laboratory 
examination of all wild boar and domestic pigs found dead as well as Active 
surveillance, are the most effective means for early detection.  Awareness campaigns 
for farmers, hunters and travellers as well as adequate training opportunities are 
also of special importance. Trust should be established between veterinary services 
and small farmers and communication and good collaboration between vets and all 
the involved parties should be encouraged at all levels. In addition, political 
commitment and financial support to all concerned parties is crucial. Despite the 
challenges, successful ASF control in backyard holdings can be reached. 
  -37- 
Bibliography 
1. Report on African Swine Fever in Asia and the Pacific. Thirty-fifth Session of the FAO 
Regional Conference for Asia and the Pacific. 
2. European Commission-Overview :Pork , available at : https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-
farming-fisheries/animals-and-animal-products/animal-products/pork_en 
3. AFRICAN SWINE FEVER: DETECTION AND DIAGNOSIS, A manual for veterinarians ,Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 2017,Daniel Beltrán-Alcrudo, Marisa 
Arias and Carmina Gallardo,Scott A. Kramer,Mary-Louise Penrith , Akiko Kamata and 
Lidewij Wiersma. 
4. African swine fever , L.K. Dixon , H. Sunb , H. Roberts 
5. Epidemiological considerations on African swine fever in Europe 2014–2018, Erika 
Chenais1 , Klaus Depner2 , Vittorio Guberti , Klaas Dietze , Arvo Viltrop and Karl Ståhl 
6. African Swine Fever Status in Europe, Przemyslaw Cwynar , Jane Stojkov  and Klaudia 
Wlazlak  
7. Transboundary spread of pig diseases: the role of international trade and travel Daniel 
Beltran-Alcrudo , John R. Falco , Eran Raizman and Klaas Dietze 
8. Gaps in African swine fever: Analysis and priorities M. Arias, C. Jurado,C. Gallardo, J. 
Fernandez-Pinero, J. M. Sanchez-Vizcaıno 
9. African swine fever: a global view of the current challenge Ma Carmen Gallardo, Ana de la 
Torre Reoyo, Jovita Fernández-Pinero, Irene Iglesias , Ma Jesús Muñoz and Ma Luisa Arias 
10. African Swine Fever: Lessons to Learn From Past Eradication Experiences. A Systematic 
Review, Maria Luisa Danzetta, Maria Luisa Marenzoni, Simona Iannetti, Paolo Tizzani, Paolo 
Calistri, and Francesco Feliziani. 
11. African Swine Fever Virus: An Emerging DNA Arbovirus, Natasha N. Gaudreault, Daniel W. 
Madden, William C. Wilson, Jessie D. Trujillo,and Juergen A. Richt 
12. Architecture of African swine fever virus and implications for viral assembly, Nan 
Wang, Dongming Zhao,Jialing Wang, Yangling Zhang, Ming Wang, Yan Gao, Fang Li  
13. Genetic and antigenic diversity of African swine fever virus ,Alexander Malogolovkina , 
Denis Kolbasov 
14. An Update on the Epidemiology and Pathology of African Swine Fever ,J. M. Sanchez-
Vizcaıno , L. Mur , J. C. Gomez-Villamandos  and L. Carrasco. 
15. European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Epidemiological analyses of African swine fever in 
the European Union (November 2018 to October 2019)  
  -38- 
16. Evolution in Europe of African swine fever genotype II viruses from highly to moderately 
virulent Gallardo, Nurmoja , Soler , Delicado  , Simón , Martin , Perez , Niet , Arias M. 
17. COMMISSION DECISION of 26 May 2003 approving an African swine fever diagnostic 
manual (notified under document number C(2003) 1696) (Text with EEA relevance) 
(2003/422/EC),available at : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003D0422&from=EN 
18. Better Training for Safer Food Initiative, Introduction to African swine fever, Edvins 
Olsevskis (prepared in collaboration with M.Masiulis), available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/ad_cm_asf_btsf-asf_latest_pres-
01.pdf 
19. Merck Veterinary Manual. Merck & Co. Inc. and Merial Ltd. 
20. African Swine Fever Virus: a new old enemy of Europe, Agata A. Cisek , Iwona Dąbrowska , 
Karolina P. Gregorczyk , Zbigniew Wyżewski 
21. Terrestrial manual ,Swidae, ASF,Chapter 3.8.1, OIE 2019 
22. Transmission routes of African swine fever virus to domestic pigs: current knowledge and 
future research direction, Claire Guinat, Andrey Gogin, Sandra Blome, Guenther Keil, Reiko 
Pollin, DipBiol, Dirk U. Pfeiffer, Tierarzt, and Linda Dixon 
23. African swine fever virus excretion patterns in persistently infected animals: A quantitative 
approach H.C. de Carvalho Ferreira , E. Weesendorp , A.R.W. Elbers , A. Bouma  , S. Quak , 
J.A. Stegeman , W.L.A. Loeffen 
24. African Swine Fever in a Bulgarian Backyard Farm— A Case Report Laura Zani , Klaas 
Dietze, Zlatina Dimova , Jan Hendrik Forth , Daniel Denev , Klaus Depner and Tsviatko 
Alexandrov. 
25. Impacts of African Swine Fever on Pigmeat Markets in Europe, Jarkko K. Niemi 
26. USDA, United States Department of Agriculture, available at : 
https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/bulgaria-livestock-and-products-annual-2 
27. ASF is a growing problem for Poland, Pig Progress, available at: 
https://www.pigprogress.net/Health/Articles/2020/7/ASF-is-a-growing-problem-for-
Poland-615815E/ 
28. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2002/60/EC of 27 June 2002 laying down specific provisions for the 
control of African swine fever and amending Directive 92/ 119/EEC as regards Teschen 
disease and African swine fever, available at : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32002L0060 
29. European Commission, ASF, available at: https://e.c.europa.eu/food/animals/animal-
diseases/control- measures/asf_en 
  -39- 
30. Relevant Measures to Prevent the Spread of African Swine Fever in the European Union 
Domestic Pig Sector, Cristina Jurado, Marta Martínez-Avilés, Ana De La Torre, Marina 
Štukelj,  Helena Cardoso de Carvalho Ferreira,  Monica Cerioli, José Manuel Sánchez-
Vizcaíno  and  Silvia Belini. 
31. SANTE/7112/2015-Rev. 3 WORKING DOCUMENT, Principles and criteria for geographically 
defining ASF regionalization, available at : 
https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/ad_control-measures_asf_wrk-
doc-sante-2015-7112.pdf 
32. SANTE/7113/2015 – Rev 12 WORKING DOCUMENT Strategic approach to the management 
of ASF for the EU, available at : 
https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/ad_control-measures_asf_wrk-
doc-sante-2015-7113.pdf 
33. European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Research gap analysis on ASF, available at:  
https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5811 
34. Biosafety Μanual for pig farms, available at: 
http://www.minagric.gr/images/stories/docs/agrotis/XOIROI/egxiridio_panoli_xoiron_epix
071119.pdf 
35. Better Training for Safer Food Initiative, Hunting wild boar under biosecurity, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/ad_cm_asf_btsf-asf_latest_pres-
02.pdf 
36. European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Risk assessment of ASF in the south-Eastern 
countries of Europe, available at: 
https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5861 
37. COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2019/2169 of 17 December 2019 amending 
the Annex to Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU concerning animal health control 
measures relating to African swine fever in certain Member States (notified under 
document C(2019) 9369), accessed on November 2020 
38. Animal Health - Regulatory Committee – presentations, PAFF Committee, Animal Health 
& Welfare Brussels, 13-14 February 2020, African Swine Fever Current Situation in Greece, 
Ministry of Rural Development and Food Directorate General of Veterinary Services Animal 
Health Directorate Department of Infectious and Parasitic Diseases, available at : 
https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/health/regulatory_committee/presentations_en, 
accessed on November 2020 
39. COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2020/209 of 14 February 2020 concerning 
certain protective measures relating to African swine fever in Greece (notified under 
document C(2020)962, available at : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32020D2019 ,accessed on November 2020 
  -40- 
40. Press Release, 22/04/20, Regional Unit of Serres, available at: 
http://www.pkm.gov.gr/default.aspx?lang=el-GR&page=271&pressid=20169, accessed on 
November 2020 
41. Press Release, 16/04/20, Ministry of Rural Development and Food, available at:  
http://www.minagric.gr/index.php/el/the-ministry-2/grafeiotypou/deltiatypou/9740-
dt160420a, accessed on November 2020 
  
   
  -1- 
 Appendix 
List of Figures 
 
1. Figure 1: Global pork production: Modified by: Source FAO 2017, ASF Manual for 
Veterinarians 
2. Figure 2 : Pig meat: slaughtering in the EU Member States, 2016, Modified by 
Source: Eurostat 
3. Figure 3 : Chronology of the transcontinental spread of ASFV and outbreaks in 
domestic pigs and detection in wild boar during 2018 
4. Figure 4 : Map of outbreaks of ASF in Europe in domestic pigs, and in wild boars, 
reported from January to 10 September 2020 
5. Figure 5 : The ASF virus close up 
6. Figure 6 : Architecture of the ASF virion 
7. Figure 7 : Clinical signs of acute ASF 
8. Figure 8 : Post mortem Findings of acute ASF 
9. Figure 9 : ASF hosts 
10. Figure 10: The ASF epidemiological cycles 
11. Figure 11 : Free-range pigs in a fenced area 




List of Tables 
 
1. Table 1:Numbers of confirmed ASF outbreaks reported in domestic pigs 
(backyard and commercial) January 01 – September 10, 2020 
2. Table 2: Numbers of ASF cases reported in wild boar January 01 – September 10, 
2020.     
3. Table 3 : Surveillance and Protection zones 
 
 
List of Abbreviations  
a. ASF : African Swine Fever 
b. Abs : Antibodies 
c. Ag:  Antigen 
d. EDTA : Ethylene diamine tetraacetic acid  
e. EFSA : European Food Safety Authority  
f. ELISA : Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
g. E.U : European Union 
h. Had : Haemadsorption. 
i. IIF: Indirect immunoflourescence. 
j. NRL : National Reference Laboratory 
k. PCR : Polymerase chain reaction 
l. Pi : Post infection 
 
